below, Central America became one area of particular attractiveness, and not merely for its direct economic role, but also for its political and strategic potential in Prussia's future.
Within this period of German history lies hidden the 1848 Revolution's relationship to the United States-British struggle for domination in Central America after 1848. The 1848-1849 Revolution left Germany with a shaken, if ultimately strengthened Prussian monarchy and a revitalized nationalism. The bourgeoisie had missed an opportunity to establish a liberal democratic regime. The aristocratic and monarchical forces in Germany sought internal and external policies which would eliminate foreseeable future major social-political problems. Thus, understanding Prussia's response to its grave internal problems facilitates comprehension of Prussia's analysis of the significance for Germany of the struggle between Britain and the United States over transit rights, naval stations, and political, military, and economic influence in Central America 2 .
Current German historiography tends to associate German imperialism with the personality and era of Bismarck. Yet Prussian policy toward Central America around 1850 represented a concrete manifestation of a German imperial process which began before Bis-marck's rise to power. Just as the Prussian government had intervened to supervise and regulate the domestic economy in the 1830s and 1840s when it judged the contemporary trends and tendencies dangerous to Prussian (German) well-being and security, so would the Prussian government intervene in foreign affairs -for example, assuring German access to world trade-transit routes -when it judged certain actions necessary to protect and secure Germany's present and future well-being and security. Such broad German concerns were discussed in the Frankfurter Assembly, in the Prussian government, and among a wider community within Germany during the late 1840s and early 1850s 3 .
One matter attracting some attention at the Frankfurter Assembly was the relationship of the German consular service to the expanding German commercial economic interests and to the broader concerns of German nationalism. The parameters defining German links to the world economy would influence the course of German nationalism. Generally, the more serious observers argued that Germany needed more consulates if it were to function well in the international trade and commercial areas 4 .
Since the consular service was viewed as an integral element of German nationalism and the German economy, the Frankfurter parliament asserted early its central authority over German international representation, including the diplomatic and consular service. Moreover, since consuls required knowledge and experience to be most effective, one suggestion called for them to receive training as consul-candidates in the Foreign Ministry together with veteran consuls and domestic chambers of commerce. The consul-candidates' formal knowledge should include languages, statistics, history, and maritime, international, and commercial law. It was also considered essential that the new consular service should be national and professional. Only with common German consulates operating under a common German trade flag could "Germany's trade power become as great and respected as was suited to a mighty nation". This national consular service could be implemented without slighting the federal states. When a matter was only of interest to one German state, the consuls would be permitted to correspond directly with that state. It was necessary to eliminate the existing competition among the consular representatives of Germanic states which often produced ridicule, endangered German citizens by reducing the credibility of German consuls, and reduced the effectiveness and prestige of Germany. "One of the important arguments against retention of consuls from the individual states", a Bundestag report claimed, was the "necessity for Germany to appear as a compact powerful state in the eyes of foreigners". Furthermore, a tendency toward uniformity in German domestic and commercial law and toward uniformity in international commercial law reduced the significance of consular acquaintanceship with the law of each German state 5 .
Replacing the merchant-consuls so often used by German states with civil servant consuls would represent a major step towards building a sound, dynamic consular service. Salaried, full-time consuls would improve the informational service of the consular branch, allowing regular reports to be distributed to every German state. The full-time consular agents would develop better relations with the host country (which would not consider them merchant adventurers) and with their countrymen (who would not see them as competitive commercial agents). Furthermore, only German citizens would be entrusted in the new professionalized consular service. The fragmented German consular services had handled German interests carelessly in the past, a Bundestag study reported, for various reasons: responsibility rested with a divided German nation and consular service, the lack of a uniform commerce and shipping system, and a lack of German sea power. These flaws were correctable, particularly when one considered the current and potential value of German trade and the modest sum needed for adequately staffing a German consular service 6 .
Prussian-German attention was focused upon Central America in the late 1840s and early 1850s due to reports from the Hansa, Hannoverian, and Prussian Consul in Guatemala, Carl Friedrich Klee, Prussian Minister Friedrich von Rönne in Washington, and Prussian Minister von Bunsen in England concerning developments in the British-U.S. struggle regarding sovereignty, transit, and influence in Middle America. In addition, various German colonization societies and several missionary groups, principally the Moldavians, peppered German society with propaganda and publicity tracts. The evaluations of these Prussian foreign agents, while hesitant and contradictory at times, on balance indicated, at this early date, a suspicion that the United States sought a protectorate arrangement which threatened to limit European access to the opportunities of the Middle American isthmus 7 .
Confronting steady internal pressures sharpened by the 1848-1849 revolution in Germany, the simultaneous pressure related to the 1848-1850 crisis in Central America, stimulated by information (from Prussian diplomats, colonization and missionary groups, and merchant interests) and emigration activities, the Prussian government actively studied Central America in 1850 and 1851 in order to define better Prussian-German interests and role in Central America (and world trade) and to shape a policy which could best fulfill Germany's destiny in these matters. In particular, ideas emanating from Prus-6 ) Ibid. sian Finance Privy Councilor Franz Hugo Hesse detailed an integrated plan for expanding and preserving German interests while alleviating internal German disorder. In September, 1850, Hesse submitted his memorandum, "Andeutungen über Mittel-Amerika und seine Zukunft" (considerations regarding Middle America and its future), to the King's government. The "Andeutungen" with annexes and British supplements analyzed the significance of potential joint British-American control of Middle American transit rigths upon Germany's future role in world commerce. Recalling the historical, strategic, economic, and political factors which sustained the great power competition in Middle America, Hesse proposed a basic plan for assuring German interests in Middle America. Then, Prussian ministers and ministries responded to Hesse's position papers and projected their own views of the Prussian-German future in a dynamic, changing world. This crucial decision-making process shed light upon Prussia and Germany in the late 1840s and early 1850s and also upon Prussian perspectives of Germany's future role in the world 8 .
Britain and the United States normally determined the significance of foreign trading areas, Hesse observed, while Germany merely accepted its position without challenging the major powers. Often, Germany misread its own growing power and entered areas too late to participate in trade and productive activity. Although the transit potential of the isthmus had been acknowledged since the beginning of Spanish rule, Hesse asserted, the route had not been developed because it was considered unprofitable, or unfeasible, or capital was lacking. The Clayton-Bulwer agreement of 1850 between Britain and the United States revealed that the great trading nations had refocused attention upon the Central American isthmus as a link between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans 9 .
Hesse informed his Prussian colleagues of the recent flood of diplomatic and consular representation to Central America. Recognizing the increasing and potential value of this narrow isthmus, Hesse observed, Britain, the United States, France, Sardinia, and Belgium recently had sent diplomatic agents and Hannover and the The main integrated body of policies and programs which were aimed at assuring Prussian-German interests in Central America were related to the impact colonization projects and dreams came to have upon the Prussian bureaucracy. The Prussian government apparently accepted Hesse's contention that an active mission linked to colonization, trade, and acquisition of political influence would cancel any negative effects of the U.S.-British Clayton-Bulwer pact upon Prussian interests and simultaneously facilitate the resolution of various aspects of the internal Prussian-German economic and political social crisis.
Closely related to Prussian-German concern about the importance of Central America in the mid-nineteenth century was the budding of German colonization schemes. The 1840s and early 1850s were marked with German colonization activity and sprinkled with thoughts that colonizing was more than a dispersal of unwanted or unneeded Germans, but rather colonizing could easily become a useful form of extending Germandom to parts of the world essential for the homeland's well-being 12 . perfect target, directing dissipateci labor and capital to long-term German goals, was Central America. Projecting no interference from either Britain or the United States, Hesse claimed, 1850 was an ideal time to plant German colonists. England would not oppose informal empire based upon informal colonization, in his judgment. England had rejected acquisition of formal colonies, because their costs were greater than their returns, and only individual naval stations were needed to sustain England's political position. Hesse noted that England had altered its trade policy, only seeking new markets which it could secure through political influence. A market in Central America only made sense if that region's population and production would increase. Ultimately, Hesse warned, the rapidly increasing North American population would expand southward, penetrating the borders of Middle America. Germany should not fear hindrance from North America at that time because Germany was not a great trading nation and hence would not appear as a dangerous competitor. Moreover, Hesse contended, North America was temporarily wrapped up in its internal development 16 .
Everything pointed to Central America's great future and key role in the next transformation of world trade. North Germany with its trading and shipping firms and Prussia with the industry of the Customs Union, Hesse insisted, should not inattentively observe this development. "German business activity and production are in the midst of irresistible growth", Hesse boasted, "yet if this growth is to become a blessing and not a curse, Germany needs new markets which could still be found in the Middle American states if Germany immediately applies the right means." Earlier, Friedrich List, in The National System of Political Economy, also had argued in a similar vein that Middle America was an excellent prospect for a new rich market for manufactures and as a goal for colonization 17 .
Hesse judged that Germany could pursue a policy in harmony with other states which strove to colonize tropical lands and to locate world raw material and market factors necessary to increase their production. Germany would use its emigrants to increase its direct imports of tropical products and to expand its colonial markets, 16 ) ¡bid. I7 ) Ibid, 103-107; Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, London 1928. thereby emancipating itself from foreign controlled markets. Happily, Hesse proclaimed, German immigrants could preserve their nationality in Middle America. In this instance, by retaining ties with the fatherland, their labor would strengthen Germany's reputation. Normally, German emigrants lost contact with the fatherland, so that each lost son became, in effect, an opponent of the fatherland, contributing his labor and services to the new country. Thus, Hesse lamented, Germany's radical element strengthened the democratic direction of the New World. The loss of German emigrants to the fatherland was painful and unnecessary. German emigrants could easily be guided toward certain goals, Hesse maintained, if they could depart under German protection. Since most emigrants had no predetermined goal, Hesse proposed directing these German emigrants to locations which offered ample land and desirable conditions for German settlements. Furthermore, the proposed settlement areas should offer a healthy climate, where a powerful nationality did not already exert authority and where Prussian government agents could obtain sufficient influence to establish an informal protectorate relationship. Not many areas offered such favorable conditions, but Central America did. Central America's natural and political advantages would permit "a talented and energetic Prussian agent to found a new overseas Prussia" 18 .
Little would be required to initiative Prussia's great prospects in Central America. Without burdening the state treasury, success would simply follow the silent collection of the otherwise dispersed capital and labor of the numerous German emigrants who normally became the body of foreign nations. Success, Hesse observed, required "Prussia to turn its full attention to the states of Middle America in the interest of German trade and in harmony with the suggestions manifest in the draft Customs Union bill to protect German emigration and colonization". The situation demanded, therefore, that Carl Frederick Klee should be replaced by a salaried, fulltime consul general accredited to Mosquito, New Granada, and the five Central American republics. Klee could remain as consul for Guatemala, subordinated to the consul general. Hesse also reommended moving the consulate general to Granada, Nicaragua, a central site, closer to the vital transit routes. Since the Nicaraguan government urgently desired a Prussian agent, the move should foster important advantages for German trade and German settlements in Nicaragua. Moreover, the appointment of a consul general would respond to the Prussian legislative resolutions which had urged the expansion of Germany's trade representation and the desirability of increasing the number of consular officials. "Only if we quickly respond to these resolutions will Prussia still manage to gain the influence which it needs for itself and for Germany", Hesse warned. "Relationships are in the midst of very rapid development. If Prussia hesitates, then other powers will win the influence in Central America which Germany's national hesitation has previously disdainfully lost everywhere" 19 . In October, 1850, the Berlin Colonization Society for Central America had supported Hesse's position in a memorandum to the Prussian King. This memorandum reiterated Hesse's arguments relative to the immense potential importance of the isthmian canal route, the sharp British-American competition which led to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, the unfortunate loss to Germany of population and wealth through uncontrolled emigration, the absolute necessity for Prussia to secure a place on the ground floor of Central American transit, and the need for private colonies in Central America under royal Prussian protection. Since "an unlimited field of activity had opened to the world competition", the Berlin Colonization Society requested the King "to direct attention to an essentially Prussian colonization of Middle America on both sides of the ship canal since this would initiate the desired influence of Prussia on world trade and on the trade policy of the sea". Middle America's star was rising in Europe. Previously, Prussia had neglected world trade, focusing upon internal German affairs. Now, even Austria sought German settlers to implement its emigration and colonization policy. Moreover, the Berlin Colonization Society alleged that English, North American, and French agents in Germany sought to attract German immigrants to aid them to win control in Central America peacefully. With a sparce white population, Middle America could still fall to Prussian rule if an active, government-, controlled emigration policy were adopted quickly. Germany could even extract profit from Belgium's troubled Santo Tomás colony. Higher authorities within Germany who sought to protect the fatherland tradition must support a German colonization project. Just as Santo Tomás had benefited from King Leopold's protection, the Berlin Colonization Society hoped the Prussian King would aid their project 24 . Finally, the Berlin Colonization Society supported Hesse's wish to be named consul general for Central America.
Ultimately, the Prussian cabinet recommended Hesse for the post of consul general 25 . Accepting these recommendations, the King appointed Hesse and covered his salary for 1851 from the extraordinary legation budget. Using the salary of other agents in Central America as guide lines to determine the consul general's salary and living expenses, a salary of £ 1,200 or M 8,400 was judged appropriate. Displaying an agrarian aristocratic perspective, von Rabe particularly objected to Hesse's expectation of a salary increase merely because he was undertaking a mission to advance Prussian trade interests. Later, von Rabe also objected to the appointment and salary of M 1,500 assigned to a counselor or secretary for Hesse. Hesse's proposal encountered competition from an existing German colonization scheme in Mexico. The Prussian minister to the United States, Baron Friedrich von Gerolt, feared dispersing German colonists into small bands. Moreover, the experience of the colony in Mexico was not very encouraging. Except for some large German landholders, few settlers remained, von Gerolt observed, at the original location. However, the Mexican colonization venture, which merely placed independently emigrating Germans together, was not comparable, in Hesse's judgment, to the Central American proposal. Most importantly, the planned Central American colonization rested on significant internal Prussian political assumptions: that colonization represented the enterprising spirit of the people, that the planless expectations of the excited masses needed steering to a healthy, if also distant goal, that general approval existed in the whole land for the project, and that liberals, who unceasingly expended their energy in fruitless fields of reform, would participate.
Hesse questioned whether the Mexican project was realistic. Even if it were, Hesse concluded, the Central American project would only compliment the Mexican project because "to reach the west coast harbors of the Mexican land under consideration, the Prussian government must secure transit through the Middle American isthmus for its colonists and its goods" 28 .
Moreover, either Panama or Nicaragua would supply the transit connection. Ultimately, Hesse asserted, the Nicaraguan canal must be built and become the focal point for a new transformed world trade. Thus, Hesse warned, Prussia must quickly insure its influence near the Nicaraguan route. The Berlin Colonization Society's plans Agreeing with Pommer Esche's suggestion, von Manteuffel listed other treaty advantages opportunely worth striving for, such as freedom from tariffs for certain goods the settlers might use, freedom from the domestic military duty of the Middle American states, or, if they must perform military duty, at least in a separate German unit with German officers. While many German emigrants came from South Germany, von Manteuffel's memorandum pointed out that, in fact, a majority of the emigrants came from Prussia and the Customs Union. Thus, in this early phase of modernization, the surplus population came from the industrial rather than the agrarian states of Germany.
The Central American states often had no firmly fixed policies regarding immigration. Prussia often represented its Customs Union associates in negotiations to obtain for the best terms for German immigrants. Since the Central American states normally preferred German immigrants, Prussia had good bargaining prospects. The
Ibid. Prussian politicians preferred the immigrants to settle together, to preserve a German character through churches, schools, clubs, and societies, to supply most of the technical and labor force for establishing the colony, and to draft their own community governmental document. Much of the protection and regulation of the German settlements would derive from the Prussian agent's success in inducing the local government to enact proper legislation. Local preparation for settlers would be an important function of Prussia's diplomatic agent in Middle America 31 .
Interweaving the ideas which won approval in the exchange between the Prussian interest groups and the Prussian government, Hesse drafted the instructions for his mission which were then apparently distributed to the German states. Hesse's mission sought formal treaty ties based upon the newly revealed importance of Middle American states for world commercial policy. Hesse's mission should facilitate Prussian political influence in these states, while increasing commercial opportunity for German industrial production. Since Middle American business conditions were poorly known in Germany, the mission should disseminate information about trade, markets, geography, climate, resources, and political institutions in the Central American states. Presumably, information about Middle American minerals, agricultural products, communications and transportation routes would stimulate German trade, colonization, and investment. The Prussian agent was also instructed to devote special attention to prospects for German emigration to these lands, the influence of emigration on the productive capability in these lands, and the repercussion of emigration on German commerce. Hesse should aid German immigrants in obtaining religious freedom and should oversee whether local governments kept their promises to immigrants groups. The consul general should extend maximum protection and welfare to Germans without promising material support. He must nurture and reinforce the favorable inclination of these lands toward Germany 32 . Consistent with Prussia's ambitions in Germany, Hesse should not consider himself merely an agent for Prussian interests, but he should seek opportunities to animate the Customs Union states. While reporting on all Middle American treaties with third parties, he should devote particular attention to those containing provisions or conditions of interest to the Customs Union. Hesse was instructed to evaluate the advisability of Prussia or the Customs Union adhering to the British-United States treaty to neutralize future isthmian transit systems. In any event, he should prepare the countries to which he was accredited for treaty negotiations 33 .
Hesse was given ample latitude with regard to administrative and routine affairs. He was free to select his permanent residence. After due consideration, Hesse could recommend consuls or vice-consuls for other areas judged significant for German trade. However, to serve as Prussian consular agents, Hesse should seek out respected, reliable people who possessed energy, talent, and facility with the German language. Hesse would supervise the consuls and consular agents in the areas to which he was accredited. However, because Hesse's territory was large and communications were poor, the consular officials would be allowed occasionally to correspond directly with the Foreign Ministry. Stil, each consular agent's annual report would be addressed to the Foreign Minister, but sent through Hesse. Since his mission involved significant commercial matters, Hesse was authorized to communicate directly with the Commerce Ministry 34 .
Hesse quickly took the first step to solidify the Germandom of the colonists going to Central America. In April and May, 1851, he contacted the central organization of Germany's Protestant churches, the Evangelic Church of the Union (Evangelische Kirche der Union, or EKU), to solicit bibles, song books, and spiritual assistance for the emigrating Germans. Hesse and the EKU leadership agreed to cooperate to preserve German culture and particularly the Protestant religion among the emigrants. Since the Spanish states only supplied funds for the Catholic religion, Hesse pointed out that any other authorized religion had to generate its own funds. strong. With his wife and six sons accompanying him, Hesse recognized the need to erect a regular religious service to attract migrating German families. Hesse hoped the EKU could find funds for a minister and, later, also a teacher with a religious orientation. In the meantime, Hesse only asked for the necessary religious materials. The director of the EKU gladly offered Hesse song books and similiar religious assistance. Hesse volunteered to report to the EKU director as soon as possible on the situation of the Protestant German settlers in the various countries 35 .
Increased interest produced increased German involvement in Central American internal disputes, while the imperial nature of the interest of industrialized countries prompted competitive maneuvering and politicizing among them. During the winter and spring of 1850-1851, Consul Klee had worked with the U.S. Consul Stephen Weems to mediate the mounting tension between El Salvador and Honduras on one side and Guatemala on the other side. When fighting broke out, their combined efforts played a role in bringing the sides to a conference which ended the struggle. Independently, the French offered their good offices, but they never became a party to the joint German and U.S. mediation efforts. Although Klee assigned considerable responsibility for the conflict to El Salvador's striving to establish the Central American Union which Britain and Guatemala opposed, El Salvador, nevertheless, welcomed the German mediation effort and expressed its gratitude. In early 1851, in the midst of the model cooperation between Prussia and the United States, Henry Savage replaced U.S. Consul Weems. Savage immediately complained that Weems had trusted Klee who was "subservient to political ends in opposition to the policy of the United States government". Savage implied additional unspecified objections to Klee 36 . Savage's attitude reflected a suspicion of Germans in Guatemala which many of his successors would share. strengthen its ties to European countries. Like Nicaragua, Costa Rica chose to pursue diligently Austrian recognition. Austrian diplomats in London, Rome, and Washington were asked about recognizing Costa Rica and negotiating trade agreements. Austria was definitely interested not only in Costa Rica, but in Central and South America as well. While expecting trade agreements to follow recognition, isthmian transit was enticing to the Austrian government. Equally certain, the Austrian government only desired commercial and transit advantages and wanted no political entanglements to follow its recognition. Soon after the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was signed, Guatemala and Honduras also sounded out Austria about possible recognition. Inescapably, the value of the isthmian routes and the increased great power involvement in Middle America prompted the small Middle American states to seek protectors, friends, trading partners, or simply a counter-force to aggressive, dominant powers wherever they could find them 39 . Unfortunately, it was not possible to locate and analyze complete, or near complete, data series on German trade and shipping connections with Central America in the 1840s, 1850s, and 1860s in order to lend convincing empirical support to an argument about the focal nature of the years from 1848 to 1858 in creating a Prussian trade policy in Central America which supported German-Prussian projects to assure access to the vital communication routes of the world market. German trade and navigation were interwoven with a colonization impulse to promote Prussian-German goals related to reliable access to world transit routes. Part of the problem regarding non-existent or unreliable data for the 1830s and 1840s stems from the low level of trade. Beginning in the mid-1850s, regular, reliable trade data series for Guatemala and Costa Rica correspond with moderate, consistent trade relations. Apparently, a low level of trade was as important as poor record keeping for the incomplete data.
The reliability of the data, even when available, is subject to some caution because the Central American nations had low educational levels, and practices such as bribery, smuggling, and indirect trade all distorted the trade and navigation data. For example, no nation in the mid-nineteenth century attempted to keep records on indirect trade. Yet, it was well known that a considerable quantity of German goods went through Great Britain to Belize or Central America where they were recorded statistically as British goods. Still, in sum, the scattered empirical data indicate that German direct trade achieved a moderate level after the mid-1850s. This time frame, during and immediately after the Hesse mission, lends credence to the claim that Hesse's work facilitated trade penetration, just as the scattered data on German emigration to Central America suggests an appreciable migration to that area. Both trade and colonization furthered the Prussian government's goal of developing its influence in this crucial region. Presumably, Hesse's labor in gathering and transmitting information back to Germany and his success in creating good will, treaties, and other informal agreements in Central America bore fruit in later years, after the products of his labor had been absorbed by the German political economy. This seems to have been the case.
cally, varying from about 1 percent to 16.5 percent in the late 1850s and 1860s (see Table 2 ). Although trade was modest in the 1850s, by the early 1870s, Guatemala exported on the average about 22 percent of its products to Germany.
Hamburg and Bremen both reported sporadically on trade with Central America in the 1840s and early 1850s. Regular recording of trade with that region began in 1850 in Bremen and in 1853 in Hamburg (see Table 3 ). Hamburg's export trade with Central America began in 1853 with only 79,500 current marks. It passed the million mark level in 1869, the two million mark level in 1871, and the three million mark level in 1873. Bremen's upward trend was not nearly as rapid as Hamburg's. Reporting in gold marks, Bremen exported over a 100,000 marks to Central America in 1863 and over a half-million current marks in 1872. Bremen's imports from Central America exceeded 100,000 gold marks in 1861. Switching to current marks in 1866, Bremen passed the million mark level in 1868, the two million mark level in 1872, and three million marks in 1874.
Finally, the data on shipping lines reveal regular links between Germany and Guatemala and Costa Rica throughout the period under consideration. The available data are spotty regarding shipping ties to San Salvador. Only a few scattered pieces of data were located on the apparently weaker, less consistent merchant marine service with Honduras and Nicaragua (see Tables 4 and 5) .
Prussia was not a giant power in the mid-nineteenth century. It had had glory in its past and it had stars in its eyes when it looked into the future. The stars drew upon an energy pack of a unified, dynamic Germany. If given a choice, Prussia might well have wished to avoid entering into a decisive contest over the fate of the Middle American isthmus in the late 1840s and 1850s. It was not allowed much voice in the decision, however, which was more a product of dynamic economic social factors in the British empire and in the United States, and perhaps was spurred on by Central American states seeking the aid of its "German" rival Austria, than of internal Prussian decision-making. Prussian views of German economic growth, its own economic growth and social transformation, and its competition with Austria within Germany left it with only modest space for considering alternatives. Prussia was not centrally involved in the rush of events, which were forcing a decision upon Central American transit, because it was relegated to a secondary status; Prussia intended, however, to remove itself from the ranks of secondary powers. It could best elevate its status through German unification, with itself at the head, naturally, but the unficication would have to encompass the industrial, agricultural, and commercial heart of Germany. To this end, Prussia needed to preserve Prussian-German access to the Pacific basin trading area. Prussia certainly could not tolerate Austria becoming the sole dispenser of trade access to Central America and convenient transit rights to the Pacific.
A key factor in understanding Prussia's position was the nature of the dual competitive forces acting upon it. One pull came from Austrian competition with Prussia for leadership of a unified Germany, while the other pull came from various imperial powers which sought to maximize their rights to transit over the Middle American isthmus. If Prussia stayed outside the isthmian competition, it would probably lose ground within the German competition, just as a weak or inconsidered response might curtail or terminate Prussia's likelihood of creating a world role for a Prussian-led Germany and a rosy future for its own industrial and agricultural elite. Germany's role in Middle America increased following the arrival of Hesse's mission in Central America in the early fall of 1851. An initial phase of intense German-Prussian interest was followed by a period of declining interest beginning in the late 1850s, only to be followed by revived activity in the 1870s and 1880s. Despite fluctuations in interest, consistent with the analysis conducted around 1850 of the relationship of Prussian-German growth and development in Central America to Prussia's role in world trade, German leaders never again perceived German interests as dissociated from Middle America for an extended period. Table 1 Guatemalan and Costa Rican Imports from Germany, 1839-1872 year Guat. imports % total Guat. C.R. imports % total C. R. $/pesos imports $/pesos imports Table 4 German Shipping with Guatemala and Costa Rica, 1849-1873 no. San José, Guate-% of total no. Germ. Punta Arenas, %of year Germ. % of total mala tons tons vessels C.R. total vessels vessels % of total vessels tons tons
